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Abstract
The Hotelling game consists of n servers each choosing a point on the line segment, so as to
maximize the amount of clients it attracts. Clients are uniformly distributed along the line, and each
client buys from the closest server. In this paper, we study a fault-prone version of the Hotelling
game, where the line fails at multiple random locations. Each failure disconnects the line, blocking
the passage of clients. We show that the game admits a Nash equilibrium if and only if the rate of
faults exceeds a certain threshold, and calculate that threshold approximately. Moreover, when a Nash
equilibrium exists we show it is unique and construct it explicitly.
Hence, somewhat surprisingly, the potential occurrence of failures has a stabilizing effect on the
game (provided there are enough of them). Additionally, we study the social cost of the game (mea-
sured in terms of the total transportation cost of the clients), which also seems to benefit in a certain
sense from the potential presence of failures.
1 Introduction
Background and Motivation. The Hotelling game, introduced by Hotelling in the seminal [18], is a
widely studied model of spatial competition. It considers two servers, each can choose where to set its
shop along a street (a segment). Clients are assumed to be uniformly distributed along the street, and to
shop at the closest server. As a consequence, the payoff of each server is equal to the size of the segment
of points closer to it than to the other server (a.k.a. its Voronoi cell). A benevolent central planner, serving
the public good (i.e., the interests of the clients), would require the two servers each to occupy one of the
points 1/4 and 3/4. However, this does not produce an equilibrium, as each server can profit by moving
closer to the other. In equilibrium, both servers occupy the center of the line. This is suboptimal for the
clients, as they have to travel twice as far as in the social optimum, on average, to reach the closest server.
Thus emerges what has later been called the “Principle of Minimum Differentiation” ([3]), according to
which competitors tend to cluster together. Hotelling stressed that this game expresses not only geographic
location, but also product selection (which can be viewed as location within a characteristic space), and a
candidate’s political platform (viewed as location on the political spectrum). Accordingly, the principle of
minimum differentiation also expresses the tendency to reduce variety in products and policies. That is,
competition between companies often diminishes the choices available to consumers rather than expanding
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them. The 3-player version of the Hotelling game, studied later ([22]), has no Nash equilibrium, since each
server would seek to take up a position close to one of the other servers but not between them.
Game Theory typically assumes a reliable environment and rational payoff maximizing players. In
reality, however, no system is infallible; players are prone to mistakes and unexpected behavior, and the
environment itself is subject to failures. Therefore, it is important to examine how player strategies are
affected by failures in components of the game. In particular, in the context of the Hotelling game, it is
natural to consider an extension of the game to an n-player fault-prone Hotelling game. In such a game,
n servers choose a location along the [0, 1] segment, and as their payoff they get the expected size of
their Voronoi cell in the presence of random line faults. A line fault is a disconnection at a point on the
line through which clients cannot pass. Such line disconnections represent temporary road blockages,
which may be caused by many different reasons, e.g., construction work, traffic accidents, congested
intersections, parades, public demonstrations, etc. Such blockages clearly affect the profits of shops along
the street, and therefore change their optimal location strategies.
We are interested in studying the effects line faults have on the game, including the existence and
structure of Nash equilibria, along with other types of influences, such as the changes in total transportation
cost compared with the social optimum (possibly taking into account also the possibility that clients may
become “disconnected” from all servers when surrounded by faults. Understanding this setting calls for the
study of location games through the perspective of fault-tolerant distributed systems, and for combining
ideas from the fields of Game Theory and Computer Science.
The n-player Hotelling game on the line with a single line fault was recently introduced in Avin et
al. [2], and its Nash equilibria were completely characterized for every n. However, the framework of [2],
which is based on a uniform distribution of the fault location over the line, and the direct analysis method
employed therein, do not extend easily to settings allowing the possibility of multiple line faults occurring
simultaneously. In particular, in such a generalized setting, it is necessary to define the distribution of
failures so as to make the analysis feasible. In the current paper, we address this generalized fault setting,
define a suitable model (based on Poisson distributed failures) and analyze the properties of Nash equilibria
in it.
Our choice of the Poisson process as the distribution of faults may seem restrictive, but it turns out to
be an excellent model for many different real-world phenomena, and is commonly used as the distribution
of random and independent points in continuous space across many different disciplines, including, among
others, queueing theory [21], wireless networks [16] and continuum percolation [24].
Interestingly, the possibility of two simultaneous faults seems to radically change player behavior,
when compared to the single fault variant. Notably, we show that the possibility of more than one fault
occurring forces the servers to distance themselves from their neighbors. Hence in this setting, the principle
of minimum differentiation no longer holds, and client transportation cost in is reduced compared to the
single fault model. Another difference concerns the existence of Nash equilibria. For example, the 3-
player game admits an equilibrium in a model allowing multiple (randomly distributed) failures, but not in
the failure-free or single-failure models.
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Contributions. In our model the faults are distributed along the line according to a Poisson process
with parameter λ. Informally, each point on the line may be faulty with some small probability, such that
the number of faults is λ in expectation. We start by characterizing the Nash equilibria of the 2-player
game (Theorem 3.1). For n ≥ 3, we show that every equilibrium is what we call a canonical profile
(Theorem 3.2), i.e., the distance between every pair of neighboring players is constant, and the distance
from the leftmost player to 0 (a.k.a. the left hinterland) is the same as the distance from the rightmost
player to 1 (a.k.a. the right hinterland). Moreover, the canonical profile, when it exists, is uniquely
defined for every n and λ. This reduces our problem to considering whether the canonical profile is a
Nash equilibrium for given values of n and λ. As our main result, we show that a Nash equilibrium exists
for the n-player game if and only if λ ≥ λmin(n), for some threshold function λmin(n) (Theorem 3.3).
Additionally, we show a way to efficiently approximate the values of λmin(n) to any precision.
Finally, we also studied the effects of failures on social cost, measured in two different ways. First, we
considered failure free executions, and looked at the total transportation cost of the clients. We compared
this cost for the Nash equilibria of our game (in failure-free executions) against the cost incurred on the
clients in the Nash equilibria obtained in the classical (failure-free) Hotelling game (see Sect. 5). The
limitation of this type of comparison is that it deals only with the behavior of strategies in failure free exe-
cutions. Our second approach was therefore to concentrate on executions with failures. In such executions
it is possible for clients to get completely disconnected. In such a case, we set the cost for a disconnected
client to some (large) constant. We similarly compared the total cost to clients in Nash equilibria of our
game and in Nash equilibria of the classical game, both under the possibility of faults.
Related Work. Coping with faults constitutes a fertile area of research in Computer Science. Specifi-
cally, there is a large body of research on fault tolerant facility location problems ([4, 5, 20, 29, 30, 31]).
Recently, the issue of failures and their effects has been considered in the field of Game Theory ([11, 19,
12, 17, 25]). Nevertheless, relatively little work has been done to apply game theory to fault tolerant facil-
ity location. The few papers that do consider this problem, such as Wang and Ouyang [32] and Zhang et
al. [33], consider location models that are far removed from the Hotelling game we consider here.
Hotelling’s model and its many variants have been studied extensively. Eaton and Lipsey [8] extended
Hotelling’s analysis to any number of players and different location spaces. Our model is a direct extension
of their n-player game on the line segment. d’Aspremont et al. [6] criticized Hotelling’s finding and
showed that when players compete on price as well as location, they tend to create distance from one
another, otherwise price competition would drop their profit to zero. Our results show differentiation in
location in the classic n-player Hotelling game without introducing price competition. A large portion
of the Hotelling game literature is dedicated to models with price competition. We, however, exclusively
consider pure location competition models since they are closely related to the facility location problem
studied in Computer Science. Eiselt, Laporte and Thisse [10] provide an extensive comparison of the
different models classified by the following characteristics: the number of players, the location space (e.g.,
circle, plane, network), pricing policy, the behavior of players, and the behavior of clients. (For more
recent surveys see Eiselt et al. [9] and Ashtiani [1].)
Randomness in client behavior was introduced by De Palma et al. [7]. Their model assumes client
behavior has an unpredictable component due to unquantifiable factors of personal taste, and thus clients
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have a small probability of “skipping” the closest server and buying from another. In their model, all
servers would locate at the center in equilibrium, reasserting Hotelling’s conclusion. In our model, clients
exhibit randomness in their choice of servers as well, but in equilibrium servers create a fixed distance from
their neighbors. In a similar more recent work, Peters et al. [28] modified client behavior by introducing
queues to each server. Clients would thus behave strategically to minimize the distance and the waiting
time as a total cost.
Several recent works have considered Hotelling games on networks ([27, 14, 15]). Pa´lvo¨lgyi’s [27]
main result was that on any network there exists a Nash equilibrium when there are sufficiently many
players in the game. While we have not yet considered networks as an action space, our results imply
that for any number of players there exists a Nash equilibrium when there are sufficiently many faults.
Fournier [14] considers a general distribution of clients along the network, but assumes clients always
choose the closest server, i.e., the Voronoi cells are as in the original model. We, on the other hand, assume
the clients are uniformly distributed but the Voronoi cells are modified by faults. The discrete version of
Hotelling games on networks (a.k.a. Voronoi games) were considered by Marvonicolas et al. [23] and
Feldman et al. [13].
Avin et al. [2] introduced the fault prone Hotelling game. They studied two types of faults: line faults
and player faults. The Hotelling game with line faults they considered was limited to a single fault, and the
resulting Nash equilibria (of which there are none for n = 3, exactly one for n = 1, 2, 4, 5, and infinitely
many for n ≥ 6) were similar to the ones obtained in the failure-free setting, except with the players
located slightly closer to the center. In this paper, we show that when multiple faults are considered, a more
interesting picture emerges, and the resulting equilibria are significantly different than those obtained in
the failure-free setting. The other fault model they considered was the Hotelling game with player faults,
where each player has some probability of being removed from the game. It is shown there that in the
player faults setting there exists no Nash equilibrium for n ≥ 3 players.
2 The Model
The Game. In this section we present the location model studied in this paper. The system consists of a
finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of servers (acting as the players in our game formulation), each of whom has to
decide where to set shop along the interval [0, 1]. We assume that clients are uniformly distributed along
the line, and that they choose the closest server that is not disconnected from them. Each server wants
to maximize its expected market share in the presence of faults. It is possible for more than one server
to occupy the same location. In that case, clients choosing that location are divided equally between the
servers at that location.
The model assumes that faults, or disconnections, occur at random along the line segment [0, 1], and
clients cannot choose servers beyond a disconnection. The set of faults, denoted as F , is distributed along
the line at random according to a Poisson process with rate λ > 0. More specifically, the probability that
k faults occur in any segment [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1] is
Pr [|F ∩ [a, b]| = k] = e
−λ(b−a) · (λ(b− a))k
k!
.
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Namely, it is a Poisson distribution with rate λ(b − a). Intuitively, the Poisson process could be viewed
as a continuous analogue of the Binomial distribution. Divide the [0, 1] line into small segments of length
δ > 0 and let p = λδ . At each δ segment a fault occurs with probability p · λ. As δ → 0 the number of
faults in a segment [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1] converges to the Poisson distribution with rate λ(b−a). Alternatively, we
can define the Poisson process as a sequence of exponential random variables, i.e., the distance between
each pair of consecutive faults is an exponential random variable with rate λ. (For a formal definition of
the Poisson process see Appendix A.)
Consider a specific instance of the system. In this instance, let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ⊂ [0, 1] be the
profile of the server locations. Let F = {f1, . . . , fk} be a given set of faults that have occurred. Two
servers i, j ∈ N are said to be colocated if xi = xj . For i ∈ N , the set of i’s colocated servers is
defined as Γi = {j ∈ N | xj = xi}, and the size of this set is defined as γi = |Γi|. A server that is
not colocated with other servers is called isolated. Two servers are called neighbors if no server is located
strictly between them. A left (resp., right) peripheral server is a server that has no servers to its left (resp.,
right). The servers divide the line into regions of two types: internal regions, which are regions between
two neighbors, and two hinterlands, which include the region between 0 and the left peripheral server, and
the region between the right peripheral server and 1. (See Figure 1, where the two hinterlands are marked
by H .)
The market of each server i ∈ N is the line segment in which clients choose location xi. Note that
colocated servers have the same market. Let x`i and x
r
i be the locations of i’s left and right neighbor,
respectively. When no left (resp., right) neighbor exists we define x`i = −1 (resp., xri = 2). Let f `i and f ri
be the closest faults to the left and right of i, respectively. When there are no faults to the left (resp., right)
of xi we define f `i = −∞ (resp., f ri =∞). We define the market of i ∈ N as the segment [Li, Ri], where
Li and Ri are defined as follows:
Li =

f `i , if f
`
i ≥ x`i ;
0, if f `i < x
`
i = −1 ;
x`i , otherwise.
Ri =

f ri , if f
r
i ≤ xri ;
1, if f ri > x
r
i = 2 ;
xri , otherwise.
In the definition of Li, the first case handles a situation where a failure occurs to the left of i but to the right
of its left neighbor if exists. The second concerns the case where there are neither neighbors nor failures
to the left of i. The third handles a case where there is no failure between i and its left neighbor. The
definition of Ri is analogous.
Server i’s market is divided into two parts, [Li, xi] and [xi, Ri], referred to as server i’s left and right
half-markets, respectively.
The fault-prone Hotelling game is denoted as FPH(n,F), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players
and F is the distribution of faults. For i ∈ N , the action of player i consists of selecting its location,
xi ∈ [0, 1] . The vector x = (xi)i∈N is the profile of actions. Let x−i denote the profile of actions of
all the players different from i. Slightly abusing notation, we will denote by (x′i,x−i) the profile obtained
from a profile x by replacing its ith coordinate xi with x′i.
We denote the size of server i’s market [Li, Ri] by Di = Ri − Li. This is itself a random variable,
and we define the payoff of player i given the profile x as the expectation (over the possible failure
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configurations) of Di divided by the number of players colocated with i, namely,
ui(x) =
E [Di]
γi
.
However, for the analysis, it is more convenient to view the payoff as composed of the left and right
payoffs, Di = D`i +D
r
i , where D
`
i = xi −Li and Dri = Ri − xi, and analyze D`i and Dri separately. The
reason for this is that, as it turns out, E[Dri ] is only a function of the length xri − xi of the right region of i
and the failure distribution, and similarly E[D`i ] depends only on xi − x`i and the failures, making it easier
to analyze them separately.
Given a profile x, x′i ∈ [0, 1] is an improving move for player i if ui(x′i,x−i) > ui(x). x∗i ∈ X is a
best response for player i if ui(x∗i ,x−i) ≥ ui(x′i,x−i) for every x′i ∈ [0, 1].
A profile x∗ is a Nash equilibrium if no player has an improving move, i.e., for every i ∈ N and every
xi ∈ X , ui(x∗) ≥ ui(xi,x∗−i).
Efficiency of Equilibria. The Hotelling game with no faults, FPH(n, 0), is a constant-sum game, making
the sum of player payoffs a poor measure of efficiency since it does not depend on player strategies.
Therefore, Fournier and Scarsini [15] measure the efficiency of Nash equilibria in terms of the client’s
transportation costs. While our fault-prone Hotelling game is not a constant-sum game, we recognize the
importance of the clients’ transportation costs as a measure of efficiency, and consider it as a basis for
comparison to variants of the Hotelling game other than our own.
Following Fournier and Scarsini [15], for x ∈ [0, 1]n and y ∈ [0, 1] define the transportation cost for a
client located in y to be the distance from y to the closest server,
d(x, y) = min
i∈{1,...,n}
|y − xi| .
The failure-free transportation cost Cfree(x) is
Cfree(x) =
∫ 1
0
d(x, y)dy ,
namely, the total transportation cost for clients, when each one of them buys from the closest server. Notice
that this definition of Cfree(x) assumes that no failures have occured, and depends on the profile of player
locations alone. The definition is not easily amenable to adaptation to scenarios with failures, since once
faults actually occur, each client has some probability of being disconnected from all players, making its
expected transportation cost infinite.
To overcome this difficulty, we explore two different approaches. The first is based on using the
measure Cfree but restricting the class of scenarios on which we compare the cost of profiles. While our
model accommodates failures, and the player strategies must take this possibility into account, we measure
and compare transportation cost exclusively in the case where no faults have occurred. In other words, we
examine how the possibility of failures affects player strategies and, as a direct result, the resulting total
cost for the clients.
6
Consider a game FPH(n, λ) that has a Nash equilibrium. We denote by Sn,λ the set of pure Nash
equilibria of the game FPH(n, λ) and define the price of anarchy and the price of stability, respectively, as
PoA(n, λ) =
supx∈Sn,λ C
free(x)
infx∈[0,1]n Cfree(x)
, PoS(n, λ) =
infx∈Sn,λ C
free(x)
infx∈[0,1]n Cfree(x)
.
Our second approach to measuring client costs is to allow also scenarios with failures, and associate
a large but finite cost ψ  1 with client disconnection. Hence for y ∈ [0, 1] we define the cost for a
client located in y under a given set of faults F (the set of disconnection points) as follows. A server x
is said to be accessible from y under F if the line segment between x and y contains no point from F .
For x ∈ [0, 1]n, denote the set of servers accessible from y under F by xF (y). If xF (y) = ∅ then y is
disconnected. Define the access cost from y to x under F as
dF (x, y) =
{
d(xF (y), y), xF (y) 6= ∅ ,
ψ, y is disconnected .
The access cost under fault set F , CF (x), is
CF (x) =
∫ 1
0
dF (x, y)dy .
Letting Y cF (x) and Y
dc
F (x) denote the set of connected (resp., disconnected) clients of x under failure set
F , the access cost can be separated into
CF (x) = CcF (x) + C
dc
F (x),
where CcF (x) is the transportation cost of the connected clients Y
c
F (x), and C
dc
F (x) is the disconnection
cost incurred by the disconnected clients Y dcF (x).
3 Main Results
Characterization of Stable Profiles. Let us first characterize the profiles that lead to a Nash equilibrium
for the fault-prone Hotelling game. Given an integer n ≥ 2 and a real λ > 0, the pair (H,M), H,M ∈
[0, 1], is called a canonical pair if H and M satisfy the following equations:
eλ(M−H) =
1 + λM
2
(1)
2H + (n− 1)M = 1 (2)
λH > ln 2 (3)
The canonical pair induces a profile xn,λ for the game FPH(n, λ), such that
xn,λi = H + (i− 1)M
for every i ∈ N (see Figure 1). We refer to this profile as the canonical profile.
Remark. Whenever it exists, the canonical pair is uniquely defined for n and λ. However, we have no
closed formula for H and M as a function of n and λ. In spite of this fact, our analysis does yield a
parametric representation for M as a function of λ. Namely,
(λ(t),M(t)) = ( (n+ 1)t− 2 ln ((1 + t)/2) , 1/ (n+ 1− 2 ln ((1 + t)/2)/t) ) .
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Figure 1: The canonical profile.
Existence of Nash Equilibria. Our first result is that the fault-prone Hotelling game for two players
always has a unique Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if a canonical profile exists, then it is the unique Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. For n = 2 players, the game FPH(2, λ) has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is given by
x∗ =
{
xn,λ , if λ > 2 ln 2 ;(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, otherwise.
For n ≥ 3 players, we show that the only possible Nash equilibrium is the canonical profile.
Theorem 3.2. For n ≥ 3 players, if the game FPH(n, λ) has a Nash equilibrium, then it is unique and
equal to the canonical profile xn,λ.
Additionally, we have found sufficient and necessary conditions over the canonical pair H and M for
the existence of a Nash equilibrium (see Section B.5). For any given n and λ, we can derive H and M ,
and determine whether the canonical profile is a Nash equilibrium using those conditions. However, our
goal is to find a simple description for the set of values of λ and n for which a Nash equilibrium exists. In
fact, our main theorem shows that there exists a threshold function λmin(n) such that the game FPH(n, λ)
admits a Nash equilibrium if and only if λ ≥ λmin(n). Moreover, we show there exists a global constant
α0 from which follows an exact formulation of the threshold function λmin(n). While we do not have an
exact value of α0, we know that it is given by the intersection of two implicit functions (see Equations (15)
and (16)), which may be approximated to arbitrary precision. Moreover, any upper (resp., lower) bound
for α0 translates to an upper (resp., lower) bound for λmin(n).
Theorem 3.3. There exists a constant α0 > 0 such that the game FPH(n, λ), for n ≥ 3 players, admits a
Nash equilibrium if and only if
λ ≥ λmin(n) = (n+ 1)α0 − 2 ln
(
1 + α0
2
)
.
Moreover, α0 ≈ 0.58813, implying that a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if
λ ≥ λmin(n) ≈ 0.58813n+ 1.04931 .
We conclude with the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4. There exist global constants cmin and cmax such that if the game FPH(n, λ) has a canonical
pair (H,M) then
H/M ≥ 1− cmax ,
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and if n ≥ 3 and the game admits a Nash equilibrium, then it also holds that
H/M ≤ 1− cmin .
Moreover, cmax ≈ 0.232 and cmin ≈ −0.392.
4 Overview of the Analysis
This section provides a brief summary of our analysis, which appears in full detail in Appendix B. We
proceed in three main steps: calculating the payoff functions of players under faults, optimizing each
player’s payoff locally (within the interval between its neighbors), and finally verifying that no player has
an improving move globally (which implies a Nash equilibrium).
Payoff Functions. We start by calculating the players’ payoffs (Section B.1), considering the left and
right regions of each player separately. If a fault occurred in a region then the payoff is simply the distance
to the closest fault. Otherwise, the payoff is half the length of the region for an internal region and the entire
length of the region for a hinterland region. Denote the expected profit from a hinterland (respectively, an
internal region) of length d by Hˆ (d) (resp., Mˆ (d)). Using the law of total probability we obtain that
Hˆ (d) = [1− e−λd] /λ and Mˆ (d) = [1− e−λd (1 + λd/2)] /λ. This gives a simple function for the
payoff ui(x) of player i over any profile x, as the sum of the profits from the two adjacent regions.
Local Optimization. The next step towards finding the Nash equilibria of a game FPH(n, λ) is to opti-
mize player location locally (Section B.2), i.e., maximize ui( · ,x−i) within the interval [x`i , xri ] to ensure
no player has an improving move within the interval between its neighbors. As the function ui(t,x−i)
is continuous and concave for t ∈ [x`i , xri ], finding the maximum is reduced to solving the equation
∂ ui(t,x−i)/∂t = 0.
For an internal player i, the optimal location within [x`i , x
r
i ] is the center of the interval, (x
r
i − x`i)/2.
It follows that in every Nash equilibrium profile all internal regions are equal. For a peripheral player
i, the optimal location between its neighbor and the border of the line is given by an implicit function
(Equation (1)), which has no closed-form solution for general n and λ. For n = 2, the locally optimal
location is also globally optimal, yielding Theorem 3.1. For n ≥ 3, these two results show that if a game
FPH(n, λ) admits a Nash equilibrium, then it must be the canonical profile xn,λ, implying Theorem 3.2.
Global Stability. To check the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a game FPH(n, λ), it is left find
the canonical profile xn,λ by solving Equations (1), (2) and (3), and check whether any player has an
improving move. Actually, we show that it suffices to only check whether an internal player can improve
its payoff by moving to the hinterland (as in Figure 6c). Hence, the following condition is sufficient and
necessary for xn,λ to be a Nash equilibrium (Observation B.13):
Mˆ (M) + Mˆ (M) ≥ max
t∈[0,H]
(
Hˆ (t) + Mˆ (H − t)
)
.
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However, there is no direct method to find an exact solution for Equations (1), (2) and (3) for general n and
λ. To circumvent this difficulty, we use a reparameterization of the variables n, λ,H andM that simplifies
the analysis. Specifically, we define α = Mλ and c = 1 − H/M and show that the values of c, M , H
and λ can be expressed in terms of α and n as follows: c = ln
(
1+α
2
)
/α; M = 1n+1−2c ; H =
1−c
n+1−2c ;
and λ = α(n+ 1)− 2 ln (1+α2 ). As a consequence, for every n and α > 0 we may find λ(α), M(α) and
H(α) such that (H(α),M(α)) is the canonical pair of the game FPH(n, λ(α)). Plugging the above into
Equations (1), (2) and (3) and the condition we obtained for a Nash equilibrium (Observation B.13), we
find that for α > 0 the game FPH(n, λ(α)) has a Nash equilibrium if and only if there exist β1 ≥ 0 and
β2 ≥ 0 such that
e−α(1 + α) = e−2β1(1 + β1) ,
e−α
(
1 +
α
2
)
= e−β2
(
3
4
+
β2
2
)
,
β1 ≤ β2 .
The first two equations each implicitly defines a curve, and we prove these curves have a single point
of intersection (α0, β0). Therefore, the game FPH(n, λ(α)) admits a Nash equilibrium if and only if
α ≥ α0. Moreover, the canonical pair of this game is (H(α),M(α)), from which we construct its equi-
librium xn,λ(α). Finally, we show that α is monotonic in λ and therefore the game FPH(n, λ) has a Nash
equilibrium if and only if λ ≥ λ(α0), and thus we obtain Theorem 3.3.
5 Efficiency of Equilibria
Hotelling’s original paper illustrated the tension that exists between the stable configuration of servers and
the socially optimal outcome, which takes into account also the interests of the clients. In the 2-player
game, the only equilibrium is when both players locate themselves at the center. However, the socially
optimal outcome for the clients is obtained in a configuration that places one player at 1/4 and the other at
3/4, as this configuration minimizes the average travel distance from a client to the closest server. In the
3-player game, Hotelling showed that no Nash equilibrium exists, so there is no stable configuration, let
alone a socially optimal one.
Efficiency of Equilibria in Failure-Free Scenarios. Our model suggests that the presence of possible
failure has also some unexpected positive side-effects. In the 2-player game, depending on the failure rate
λ, the distance between the players may increase while preserving stability, reducing Cfree(x), the total
transportation cost of clients (when no faults occur). Hence, with probability e−λ, the system admits an
instance where no faults occur, and the cost is reduced as a side effect of the players’ reaction to faults.
In the 3-player game, the inclusion of random faults creates a Nash equilibrium, which does not exist
otherwise. Here, the price of disconnecting some of the clients from servers is less problematic, since
without faults the game has no stable configuration at all.
For general n, we compare the price of stability obtained by the canonical profile for different values
of λ. Namely, we consider the following three interesting values of λ for every n.
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Figure 2: The price of stability of the games FPH(n, λmin), FPH(n, λmax) and FPH(n, 0) under various n
values.
(1) λ = λmin, as defined in Theorem 3.3, which is the minimal value of λ such that FPH(n, λ) has a Nash
equilibrium. Additionally, for λmin, the distance M between neighboring players is the minimal such
distance that allows an equilibrium (by Corollary 3.4).
(2) λ = λmax, as defined at the end of Section B.4, which maximizes the possible distance M between
players in the canonical profile xn,λ (by Corollary 3.4).
(3) λ = 0, which, with a slight abuse of notation, refers to the Hotelling game with no faults.
The price of anarchy and price of stability for the fault-free Hotelling game FPH(n, 0) was studied by
Fournier and Scarsini [15]. They showed that
PoA(n, 0) =
{
2 if n is even,
2 nn+1 if n > 3 is odd,
and PoS(n, 0) =
{
n for n = 2,
1
n−2 for n ≥ 4.
It is known that C
(
xOPT
)
= 1/(2n), where xOPT is the social optimum configuration. For λ ≥ λmin, by
Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, the unique Nash equilibrium is the canonical profile, so
PoS(n, λ) = PoA(n, λ) =
Cfree(xn,λ)
Cfree(xOPT)
.
Within a hinterland of length H , the average travel distance for a client is H/2, and within an internal
region, the average travel distance is M/4. Hence,
Cfree(xn,λ) =
H
2 · 2H + M4 · (n− 1)M
2H + (n− 1)M = H
2 +
n− 1
4
M2 ,
and thus
PoS(n, λ) = PoA(n, λ) = 2n
(
H2 +
n− 1
4
M2
)
.
By Corollary 3.4, since PoS(n, λ) depends only on H , M and n, all possible values of PoS(n, λ) are
represented in the range λmin ≤ λ ≤ λmax. Moreover,
PoS(n, λmax) ≤ PoS(n, λ) ≤ PoS(n, λmin) ,
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since the average travel distanceCfree(xn,λ) decreases the largerM is. Therefore, we compare1 PoS(n, λmax)
and PoS(n, λmin) to the non-faulty PoS(n, 0) in Figure 2 above.
Figure 2 shows that PoS(n, λmax) is close to 1, i.e., the client cost is close to optimal, and that
PoS(n, λmin) is clearly smaller than PoS(n, 0) for n ≤ 13. Note, however, that for λ = λmax, the
probability of no fault occurring on the line is very small (less than e−3n).
Efficiency of Equilibria Under Failures. So far we have considered how the clients are affected by the
players reactions to possible failures. Next, we measure the effect of the failures themselves on the costs
incurred on the clients. To this end we quantify the cost to a disconnected client as ψ, and consider how
this cost affects the clients in Nash equilibria of both the failure-free Hotelling game and the fault-prone
Hotelling game proposed in this paper.
Note that the set of disconnected points consists of a finite num-
ber of continuous segments (see figure). Let LdcF (x) denote the
total length of these segments (hereafter referred to as the discon-
nected fraction), and let LcF (x) = 1 − LdcF (x) denote the total
length of the complementary segments, namely, the union of all
the markets, containing the connected clients.
Notice that the transportation cost of each client y ∈ Y cF (x) satisfies d(xF (y), y) ≤ 1, so their total
transportation cost is CcF (x) ≤ LcF (x) ≤ 1. On the other hand, the total disconnection cost of the
disconnected clients is CdcF (x) = ψ ·LdcF (x). It follows that when ψ  1, the difference between different
profiles in terms of their total access cost under a fault set F is dominated by their disconnection cost,
which in turn is proportional to their LdcF (x) value, namely, the proportion of disconnected clients.
For given x and failure rate λ, let Ldcλ (x) denote the expected value of LdcF (x) when F is distributed
according to the Poisson process with rate λ discussed above.
We are interested in comparing the costs Ldcλ (x) of three different profiles x. The first, denoted on,λ
in Figure 3, is the profile that minimizes Ldcλ (x). (This profile might not attain equilibrium.) The second,
denoted xn,λ in Figure 3, is the canonical profile xn,λ attaining Nash equilibrium in the game FPH(n, λ)
(i.e., assuming failure rate λ). The third, denoted yn,0 in Figure 3, is the profile that minimizes Ldcλ (x)
from among the profiles x attaining Nash equilibrium in the game FPH(n, 0).
Note that on,λ and xn,λ depend on both n and λ while yn,0 depends on n alone. Hence, in each graph
of Figure 3, yn,0 relates to a fixed profile under different rates λ of faults, while on,λ and xn,λ relate to
different profiles for different values of λ.
While we do not have closed-form formulae for the values of Ldcλ (on,λ), Ldcλ (xn,λ) and
Ldcλ (yn,0), we can calculate these values for different values of λ and n. Figure 3 presents graphically
the comparisons for n = 4, 8, 15. As can be seen in the figure, our profile xn,λ does better than yn,0 (and
thus better than all other Nash equilibria of FPH(n, 0) as well) once the failure rate λ increases, and its
costs are close to those of on,λ.
The reason for the gap between on,λ and yn,0 is that in all equilibria of the failure-free game FPH(n, 0)
1We do not include PoA(n, 0) in this comparison because it is much larger than PoS(n, λ).
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the peripheral servers must be colocated with their neighbors. This means that there are at most n − 2
distinct server locations. Thus, from the perspective of the clients there are two servers fewer in yn,0 than
in on,λ. Indeed, simulation results show that the disconnected fraction under yn,0 with n players closely
approximates the disconnected fraction under on−2,λ with n− 2 players for all values of λ.
In conclusion, for sufficiently large λ total client costs would be reduced under FPH(n, λ) compared
to the failure-free game whether faults occur or not. That is, clients would benefit from players reaction to
possible faults even if no such possibility exists in actuality.
6 Discussion
Our results show that when players account for the possibility of faults in their behavior the properties of
the game may be impacted in several interesting ways. In some settings a Nash equilibrium emerges where
none existed before. In others, the change in player behaviors gives rise to a unique Nash equilibrium
where infinitely many existed before. Moreover, in many settings the social cost is reduced when compared
to the Nash equilibria of the original game (whether failures occur or not). Overall, our results imply player
consideration of faults may introduce stability to the game, and in some cases even reduce social costs.
Specifically in the context of Hotelling games, our results give a possible simple explanation for cases
where the principle of minimal differentiation does not hold. That is, players prefer to clearly differentiate
from their competitors rather than clustering together.
There are many possible directions for future work. First, one may examine whether our results gener-
alize to different distributions of faults, such as other spatial point processes. Another interesting variation
would be to have faults delay the passage of clients rather than disconnecting the line entirely. Second, a
natural yet challenging extension of our work is when the game is played on networks. A vast literature
exists on the fault tolerance of networks, and the motivation for such an extension is clear. Finally, our
game may be extended to two-dimensional space. Inspired by models of wireless networks, instead of
faults one may surround each player with a circle of a randomly distributed radius, within which it obtains
the clients closer to it than other players. This models the range of influence of each player, which may be
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: The disconnected fraction for the profiles on,λ, xn,λ and yn,0 under various λ values. (a) n = 4.
(b) n = 8. (c) n = 15.
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limited due to ineffective marketing for example. It would be interesting to discover if such games admit
an equilibrium, since no equilibrium exists for failure-free Hotelling games in two-dimensional space with
more than two players.
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Appendix
A The Poisson Process
In this section we present a few well known results that are necessary for our proofs. Namely, we discuss
the Poisson process, which we use as our fault model. The following definition and theorems are taken
from Mitzenmacher and Upfal [26].
The Poisson process is a stochastic counting process which considers a sequence of random events.
Let Q(t) denote the number of events in the interval [0, t]. The locations of these events are called arrival
times. Formally, a Poisson process with parameter λ is a stochastic counting process {Q(t), t ≥ 0} such
that the following statements hold.
1. Q(0) = 0.
2. The process has independent and stationary increments. That is, for any t, s > 0, the distribution of
Q(t+ s)−Q(s) is identical to the distribution of Q(t), and for any two disjoint intervals [t1, t2] and
[t3, t4], the distribution of Q(t2)−Q(t1) is independent of the distribution of Q(t4)−Q(t3).
3. limt→0 Pr(Q(t) = 1)/t = λ. That is, the probability of a single event in a short interval tends to λt.
4. limt→0 Pr(Q(t) ≥ 2) = 0. That is, the probability of more than one event in a short interval tends
to zero.
Theorem A.1. Let {Q(t) | t ≥ 0} be a Poisson process with parameter λ. For any t, s ≥ 0 and any
integer k ≥ 0,
Pr(Q(t+ s)−Q(s) = k) = e−λt (λt)
n
n!
.
Theorem A.2. Given thatQ(t) = k, the k arrival times have the same distribution as that of n independent
random variables with uniform distribution over [0, t].
B Analysis
B.1 Calculating Payoffs
In this section we focus on calculating the payoffs of each player for any given profile.
We start by analyzing two simple cases which can be easily extended to the general setting. Suppose
the game is played on the interval [0, d] for d > 0 and player 1 is located at x1 = 0. H(d) is a random
function indicating the profit of player 1 when there are no other players in the game, i.e., [0, d] is a
hinterland. M(d) is a random function indicating the profit of player 1 when the game has two players
and player 2 is located at x2 = d, i.e., [0, d] is an internal region. Additionally, Q(d) is a random function
indicating the number of faults in the interval [0, d]. Hence, Q(d) is a Poisson process with parameter λ
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as defined in Section A. It is easy to calculate the expectations of H(d) andM(d) restricted to the case
where k faults occur in the line segment. Clearly, when no faults occur we have
E[H(d) | Q(d) = 0] = d and E[M(d) | Q(d) = 0] = d/2 . (4)
For Q(d) > 0 we have the following.
Claim B.1. For k > 0 and d > 0,
E[H(d) | Q(d) = k] = E[M(d) | Q(d) = k] = d
k + 1
.
Proof. By Theorem A.2, given that Q(d) = k, the k faults have the same distribution as k independent
random variables with uniform distribution over [0, d]. Furthermore, since k > 0, bothH(d) andM(d) are
simply the distance to the closest fault. So our question boils down to the following: suppose k > 0 faults
Y1, . . . , Yk are uniformly distributed on the interval [0, d], what is the expectation of min(Yi)? Formally
we have
E[H(d) | Q(d) = k] = E[min(Yi)] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr[min(Yi) > t] dt =
∫ d
0
Pr[min(Yi) > t] dt .
Since the Yi’s are independent and uniformly distributed in the interval [0, d] we get
Pr[min(Yi) > t] =
∏
i
Pr[Yi > t] =
(d− t
d
)k
,
and therefore
E[H(d) | Q(d) = k] =
∫ d
0
(d− t
d
)k
dt =
[
− d
k + 1
(d− t
d
)k+1]d
0
=
d
k + 1
.
By Theorem A.1, for all d ≥ 0 and k ≥ 0,
Pr[Q(d) = k] = e−λd
(λd)k
k!
. (5)
In sake of brevity, for any random variable X , we define Xˆ = E[X]. We may now find Hˆ (d) =
E[H(d)] and Mˆ (d) = E[M(d)] using the law of total probability.
Claim B.2. Hˆ (d) = 1
λ
[
1− e−λd
]
and Mˆ (d) = 1
λ
[
1− e−λd
(
1 +
λd
2
)]
.
Proof. By Claim B.1 and Equations (4) and (5), we get
E[H(d)] =
∞∑
k=0
(E[H(d) | Q(d) = k] · Pr[Q(d) = k]) =
∞∑
k=0
(
d
k + 1
· e−λd (λd)
k
k!
)
= e−λd ·
∞∑
k=0
λkdk+1
(k + 1)!
=
e−λd
λ
·
∞∑
k=1
(λd)k
k!
=
e−λd
λ
[ ∞∑
k=0
(λd)k
k!
− 1
]
=
e−λd
λ
[
eλd − 1
]
=
1
λ
[
1− e−λd
]
. (6)
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Similarly, by Claim B.1,
E[M(d)] =
∞∑
k=0
(E[M(d) | Q(d) = k] · Pr[Q(d) = k])
= E[M(d) | Q(d) = 0] · Pr[Q(d) = 0] +
∞∑
k=1
(E[H(d) | Q(d) = k] · Pr[Q(d) = k]) .
Rearranging and applying Equations (4),(5) and (6), we get
E[M(d)] = (E[M(d) | Q(d) = 0]− E[H(d) | Q(d) = 0]) · Pr[Q(d) = 0] + E[H(d)]
= E[H(d)]− d
2
Pr[Q(d) = 0] =
1
λ
[
1− e−λd
]
− d
2
e−λd
=
1
λ
[
1− e−λd
(
1 +
λd
2
)]
.
Next, consider a profile x of the game. We may now calculate the payoff of each player using the
analysis above. That is, we have the following.
Claim B.3. For every i ∈ N ,
E[Ri − xi] =
{
Hˆ (1− xi) , if i is right peripheral;
Mˆ (xri − xi) , otherwise,
and
E[xi − Li] =
{
Hˆ (xi) , if i is left peripheral;
Mˆ (xi − x`i) , otherwise.
Proof. Consider E[Ri − xi] first. Let d = 1 − xi if i is right peripheral and d = xri − xi otherwise.
Since Q(t) is a Poisson process, by definition, the number of faults within the interval [xi, xi + d] is
Q(xi + d)−Q(xi) and has the same distribution as Q(d). Hence, for all k ≥ 0
Pr[Q(xi + d)−Q(xi) = k] = Pr[Q(d) = k] . (7)
Moreover, as in Equation (4)
E[Ri − xi | Q(xi + d)−Q(xi) = 0] =
{
d , if i is right peripheral;
d
2 , otherwise.
(8)
Finally, notice that when k > 0 faults occur in [xi, xi+d], by Theorem A.2, they are uniformly distributed
in the interval. Therefore, as in Claim B.1 we obtain
E[Ri − xi | Q(xi + d)−Q(xi) = k] = d
k + 1
. (9)
Using the law of total probability and applying Equations (7),(8) and (9) we obtain the same terms as in
the proof of Claim B.2 and thus the result follows.
The proof for E[xi − Li] is similar. Note only that the analogue of Equation (9) follows from the
symmetry of the uniform distribution.
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B.2 Optimizing the Payoff Within an Interval
As we show in this section, given a profile x, for each server i there exists a single point of maximum
payoff within the interval between its neighbors. Furthermore, when each server i is located at that optimal
point between its neighbors, the profile is the canonical profile. More specifically, by Lemma B.7, for any
internal server i, the optimal location is at the center of the interval [x`i , x
r
i ]. Therefore, all internal regions
are of equal length. For peripheral servers, by Lemma B.4, the optimal location can be derived from
Equation (10).
Denote by θ(t, s) the expected market of a peripheral server with a hinterland of length t and a neighbor
at distance s from the border of the line. By Claim B.2,
θ(t, s) = Hˆ (t) + Mˆ (s− t) = 1
λ
[
1− e−λt
]
+
1
λ
[
1− e−λ(s−t)
(
1 +
λ(s− t)
2
)]
for s ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ [0, s]. Denote by µ(t, s) the expected market of an internal server i with xi − x`i = t
and xri − x`i = s. By Claim B.2,
µ(t, s) = Mˆ (t) + Mˆ (s− t) = 1
λ
[
1− e−λt
(
1 +
λt
2
)]
+
1
λ
[
1− e−λ(s−t)
(
1 +
λ(s− t)
2
)]
for s ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ [0, s].
Remark. To keep θ and µ continuous in the interval [0, s], we disregard the fact that for t = s and t = 0
the server is colocated with one of its neighbors, and assume all its payoff comes from the same interval
of length s. As we show in Claim B.9, this assumption does not affect the analysis of the Nash equilibria
of the game.
Lemma B.4. For every fixed s ∈ [0, 1] there exists a single optimal point t∗ ∈ [0, s] such that θ(t∗, s) =
maxt θ(t, s). Moreover, if λs ≤ ln 2 then θ(t, s) is monotone increasing as a function of t and thus t∗ = s,
and if λs > ln 2 then t∗ satisfies the equation
eλ(s−2t
∗) =
1 + λ(s− t∗)
2
. (10)
Additionally, if λs > ln 2 then λt∗ > ln 2 as well.
Proof. Note that
∂2 θ(t, s)
∂t2
= −λe−λt − λ
2(s− t)
2
e−λ(s−t) < 0 ,
for all t ∈ [0, s]. Hence, θ(t, s) is strictly concave as a function of t and thus has a single maximum point.
The first derivative is
∂ θ(t, s)
∂t
= e−λt − 1
2
e−λ(s−t)(1 + λ(s− t)) .
Setting t = 0 yields
∂ θ(0, s)
∂t
= 1− 1
2
e−λs(1 + λs) ,
which is positive for all s since ex > 1 + x for all real x.
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Setting t = s yields
∂ θ(s, s)
∂t
= e−λs − 1
2
,
which is non-negative whenever λs ≤ ln 2. Since θ(t, s) is strictly concave, it follows that whenever
λs ≤ ln 2 the function θ(t, s) is monotone increasing in t for t ∈ [0, s]. Therefore, it has a single
maximum point at t∗ = s.
It is left to consider the case where λs > ln 2. In this case, the maximum is obtained where the
derivative equals zero. Hence,
∂ θ(t∗, s)
∂t
= e−λt
∗ − 1
2
e−λ(s−t
∗)(1 + λ(s− t∗)) = 0 ,
which translates to Equation (10), as required.
Finally, we show that in this case λt∗ > ln 2. Assume first, towards contradiction, that λt∗ < ln 2.
Then
eλ(s−2t
∗) =
eλ(s−t∗)
eλt∗
>
eλ(s−t∗)
eln 2
≥ 1 + λ(s− t
∗)
2
,
contradicting Equation (10). Now suppose λt∗ = ln 2. Then
eλ(s−t∗)
eln 2
= er(s−2t
∗) =
1 + λ(s− t∗)
2
,
or
eλ(s−t
∗) = 1 + λ(s− t∗) ,
which holds if and only if λ(s− t∗) = 0 and thus λs = λt∗ = ln 2, which contradicts the assumption that
λs > ln 2. This proves that λt∗ > ln 2 whenever λs > ln 2, concluding the proof of the lemma.
Lemma B.5. Let s ∈ [ln 2/λ, 1] , and let t∗ be as in Lemma B.4. Then,
Hˆ (t∗) = Mˆ (s− t∗) + 1
2λ
e−λ(s−t
∗)
Proof. By Claim B.2,
Hˆ (t∗) = 1
λ
[
1− e−λt∗
]
.
Plugging in Equation (10), we get
Hˆ (t∗) = 1
λ
[
1− e−λ(s−t∗)
(
1 + λ(s− t∗)
2
)]
=
1
λ
[
1− e−λ(s−t∗)
(
1 +
λ(s− t∗)
2
)]
+
1
2λ
e−λ(s−t
∗)
Plugging in Claim B.2 we obtain the result.
Claim B.6. Let f : [0, 1]→ R be a strictly concave function, and define g(t) = f(t) + f(s− t) for some
s ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
g
(s
2
)
= max
t∈[0,s]
g(t) .
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Proof. Note that
g′(t) = f ′(t)− f ′(s− t),
and thus g′(s/2) = 0. Additionally, we have that f ′′(t) < 0 for t ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
g′′(t) = f ′′(t) + f ′′(s− t) < 0
for t ∈ [0, s]. Hence, s/2 maximizes g in the interval [0, s].
Lemma B.7. For every fixed s ∈ [0, 1] there exists a single optimal point t∗ ∈ [0, s] such that µ(t∗, s) =
maxt µ(t, s). Moreover, t∗ = s/2 for all s ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Mˆ (t) is strictly concave as a function of t, since
d2 Mˆ (t)
dt2
= −λ
2t
2
e−λt < 0 ,
for every t ∈ [0, s]. Therefore, the lemma follows from Claim B.6 and the definition of µ(t, s).
Observation B.8. For every internal server i ∈ N : ui(x) = µ(xi − x
`
i , x
r
i − x`i)
γi
.
For every left peripheral server i ∈ N : ui(x) = θ(xi, x
r
i )
γi
.
For every right peripheral server i ∈ N : ui(x) = θ(1− xi, 1− x
`
i)
γi
.
B.3 Nash Equilibria of the Game
We next consider what kinds of profiles can be Nash equilibria in our game. If n = 1, i.e., only one server
is located on the segment, then by Claim B.6, its unique optimal location is at the center, x1 = 1/2. If
n = 2, then both servers are peripheral and therefore Lemma B.4 is sufficient to find all the Nash equilibria
of the game. Hence, we next prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let (x1, x2) be a Nash equilibrium of the game and assume w.l.o.g. that x1 ≤ x2.
First note that x1 ≤ 1/2, otherwise server 2 can improve its payoff by relocating to 1 − x2 (due to the
monotonicity of the payoff from an internal region). Symmetrically, we also have x2 ≥ 1/2.
Consider the case where λ ≤ 2 ln 2, and suppose that x2 > 1/2. Hence, λx2 > ln 2 and by
Lemma B.4, it follows that λx1 > ln 2 when x1 is optimally located in the segment [0, x2]. Hence,
x1 > 1/2, contradiction. So suppose x2 = 1/2 and thus λx2 ≤ ln 2. It follows, by Lemma B.4, that the
optimal location for server 1 is at x1 = 1/2.
Now consider the case where λ > 2 ln 2. It follows that λx2 > ln 2 and λ(1− x1) > ln 2, and thus by
Lemma B.4, we get
eλ(x2−2x1) =
1 + λ(x2 − x1)
2
and eλ((1−x1)−2(1−x2)) =
1 + λ(x2 − x1)
2
,
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which yields eλ(x2−2x1) = eλ((1−x1)−2(1−x2)), and therefore x1 = 1 − x2. It follows that (x1, x2) is the
canonical profile x2,λ. Clearly, no improving move exists for either server so this is a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, consider the case where there are at least three servers in the game, i.e., n ≥ 3. First note that
in every Nash equilibrium, every server is isolated, as we show in the following claim.
Claim B.9. If n ≥ 3, then in every Nash equilibrium, γi = 1 for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that x is a Nash equilibrium and there exist servers i, i+1, . . . , i+k
such that xi = xi+1 = · · · = xi+k for k > 1. Hence,
ui(x) =
E[Ri − Li]
k + 1
.
But E[Ri − Li] = E[Ri − xi] + E[xi − Li] and therefore
max(E[Ri − xi],E[xi − Li]) > E[Ri − Li]
2
>
E[Ri − Li]
k + 1
Assume w.l.o.g. that E[Ri − xi] ≥ E[xi − Li]. Clearly, relocating to xi + ε for sufficiently small ε > 0
would improve the payoff of server i, contradicting the assumption that x is a Nash equilibrium. This
proves that γi ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N .
Moreover, even for k = 1 such an improving move exists unless E[Ri − xi] = E[xi − Li] = E[Ri −
Li]/2. So it is left to consider the case where γi = 2 andE[Ri−xi] = E[xi−Li]. At least one of the regions
incident to xi, w.l.o.g. [xi, xri ], is an internal region. Therefore, E[Ri − xi] = Mˆ (0) + Mˆ (xri − xi) =
µ(0, xri − xi). But by Lemma B.7, µ(0, xri − xi) < µ((xri − xi)/2, xri − xi), i.e., relocating to the center
of the interval [xi, xri ] improves the payoff of server i, contradiction. This proves that γi = 1 for all
i ∈ N .
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let the profile x be a Nash equilibrium. By Claim B.9, no pair of servers shares the
same location. So we may assume w.l.o.g. that 0 ≤ x1 < x2 < . . . < xn ≤ 1. LetM = x2−x1,H1 = x1
and H2 = 1− xn. By Lemma B.7 we have that M = x2 − x1 = x3 − x2 = x4 − x3 = · · · = xn − xn−1.
Substituting H1, H2 and M into Equation (10) we get
eλ(M−H1) =
1 + λM
2
and eλ(M−H2) =
1 + λM
2
which yields eλ(M−H1) = eλ(M−H2) and therefore H1 = H2 = H . This proves that xi = H + (i− 1)M
for i ∈ N , and since 1−H = xn = H + (i− 1)M , Equation (2) follows as well.
Finally, Equation (1) follows immediately by plugging H and M into Equation (10), and Equation (3)
follows from the last part of Lemma B.4. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
B.4 Properties of the Canonical Profile
Consider the canonical profile xn,λ. Then by Observation B.8, the payoff of the peripheral players is
u1(x
n,λ) = un(x
n,λ) = θ(H,H +M) = Hˆ (H) + Mˆ (M) ,
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and the payoff of each internal player i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1} is
ui(x
n,λ) = µ(M, 2M) = Mˆ (M) + Mˆ (M) .
Additionally, by Lemma B.5, the payoff of a peripheral player always exceeds the payoff of an internal
player by exactly e−λM/2λ, i.e.,
u1(x
n,λ)− u2(xn,λ) = e
−λM
2λ
.
Before we continue, we define a reparamatrization that would be useful to us in the following proofs.
Define
α = λM and c = 1−H/M . (11)
Claim B.10. The values of c, M , H and λ can be expressed in terms of α and n as follows.
(1) c =
ln( 1+α2 )
α ;
(2) M = 1n+1−2c ;
(3) H = 1−cn+1−2c ;
(4) λ = α(n+ 1)− 2 ln (1+α2 ).
Proof. Substituting c and α into Equation (1) we obtain ecα = (1 + α)/2, which yields the first part of
the claim. Plugging H = (1− c)M into Equation (2) yields the next two parts. To obtain the last part we
plug the terms we obtained for M and c into λ = α/M .
Observation B.11. The parameter λ is monotone increasing as a function of α for all α > 0 and n > 2.
Therefore, α is a monotone increasing function of λ as well.
The observation follows from the fact the α derivative of λ is strictly positive.
Keeping n fixed, by Claim B.10, for each α > 0 we obtain λ, H and M , such that H and M are the
canonical pair of FPH(n, λ). Moreover, by Observation B.11, considering λ as a function of α over the
domain α ∈ (0,∞), λ obtains all the values λ ∈ (2 ln 2,∞). In conclusion, we have the following.
Corollary B.12. The canonical profile xn,λ exists for all n ≥ 2 and λ > 2 ln 2.
Additionally, while we do not have an explicit representation of M and H as functions of λ, we may
examine the parametric curves (λ(α),M(α)) and (λ(α), H(α)) for α > 0 (see Figure 4).
The curves in Figure 4 depend on the value of n. To examine the general behavior of the canonical
profile, consider c as a function of α as depicted in Figure 5.
The function c(α) as in Part (1) of Claim B.10 has a unique maximum at the point (αmax, cmax) ≈
(3.111, 0.232), is strictly increasing for 0 < α < αmax, and strictly decreasing for α > αmax. Addition-
ally, we have that c > 0 for α ≥ 1, and as α goes to infinity, c goes to 0. Define
λmax(n) = λ(αmax) = αmax(n+ 1)− 2 ln
(
1 + αmax
2
)
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Figure 4: parametric curves of M and H as a function of λ (n = 5).
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Figure 5: c as a function of α. Note that c(1) = 0 and that as α goes to infinity c goes to zero.
By Observation B.11 and Part (2) of Claim B.10, we have that M increases with λ for 0 < λ < λmax(n),
attains its maximum value at λ = λmax(n), and then decreases with λ for λ > λmax(n). Moreover,
M ≥ H for λ ≥ n+ 1 (α ≥ 1) and as λ goes to infinity, M/H tends to 1.
B.5 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium (for n ≥ 3)
So far, we know that for any given n ≥ 3 and λ > 0, if there exists a Nash equilibrium for the game
FPH(n, λ), then it is a canonical profile (as depicted in Figure 1). The reason for that is that otherwise,
there would be at least one server that has an improving move within the interval between its neighbors (as
depicted in Figure 6a). We have not yet considered whether a server has an improving move to anywhere
outside the interval between its neighbors.
Note first that by Theorem 3.2, if for given n ≥ 3 and λ, there exist no canonical pair H and M (that
satisfy conditions (1), (2) and (3)), then no Nash equilibrium exists. This is due to the fact that in this
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(a) players relocating within the interval between their neighbors.
32 41 5
(b) a peripheral player moving to an internal segment.
32 41 5
(c) an internal player moving to the hinterland.
Figure 6: possible improving moves.
case, the peripheral servers can always improve by moving closer to their neighbors, which in turn would
improve by equalizing the internal regions, and then again the peripheral servers would move closer, this
would continue until the internal regions become too small and then an internal server would improve by
moving to the hinterland.
Hence, consider the canonical profile xn,λ. By Lemmas B.4 and B.7 we have that in each region there
is one point that maximizes the payoff. Moreover, by Claim B.9 the payoff gained from colocating with
another server j can always be exceeded by that of an isolated location within one of j’s adjacent regions.
Therefore, the canonical profile xn,λ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if relocating to the optimal location
of any region is not an improving move for any player i.
It is easy to see that no internal player has an improving move in an internal region and that no periph-
eral player has an improving move in the other hinterland (due to the monotonicity of Hˆ (d) and Mˆ (d)).
Furthermore, by Lemma B.5, the payoff of a peripheral player is larger than that of an internal player, so
no peripheral player would gain by moving to an internal region (Figure 6b). It is left to consider when an
internal player would rather move to the hinterland. That is, we must rule out the possibility that the move
depicted in Figure 6c is an improving move. Formally, this translates to the following.
Observation B.13. Let xn,λ be the canonical profile, with a corresponding canonical pair H and M .
Then xn,λ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
Mˆ (M) + Mˆ (M) ≥ Hˆ (t∗) + Mˆ (H − t∗) (12)
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where t∗ maximizes θ(t,H) as in Lemma B.4.
Notice that the right hand side of (12) is the payoff gained from locating at the optimal point of a
hinterland of length H .
This reduces the problem of finding Nash equilibria of the game to finding a canonical pair H and M
that also satisfies Equation (12). Hence, from this point forward, we focus on solving Equation (12).
Lemma B.14. If M ≥ H , then xn,λ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By Observation B.13, it suffices to show that the canonical pair H and M satisfies Equation (12) if
M ≥ H . Consider the right hand side of Equation (12). We have that
Hˆ (t∗) + Mˆ (H − t∗) ≤ Hˆ (t∗) + Hˆ (H − t∗) ≤ 2Hˆ
(
H
2
)
≤ 2Hˆ
(
M
2
)
.
The first inequality holds since Mˆ (t) ≤ Hˆ (t) for all t ≥ 0, the second follows from Claim B.6, and the
last follows from the assumption and monotonicity.
Therefore, Equation (12) is satisfied if
Hˆ
(
M
2
)
≤ Mˆ (M) .
Plugging in Claim B.2 we obtain
1
λ
[
1− e−λM2
]
≤ 1
λ
[
1− e−λM
(
1 +
λM
2
)]
.
Rearranging we obtain
e
λM
2 ≥ 1 + λM
2
,
which holds for all λ and M , concluding the proof.
Observation B.15. α ≥ 1 if and only if M ≥ H .
Lemma B.16. Fix n ≥ 3, express λ as in Part (4) of Claim B.10. Then xn,λ is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if there exists β > 0 such that
e−α(1 + α) = e−2β(1 + β) (13)
and
e−α
(
1 +
α
2
)
≤ e−β
(
3
4
+
β
2
)
. (14)
Proof. Let s = H − t∗. By Lemma B.5,
Hˆ (t∗) + Mˆ (H − t∗) = Hˆ (H − s) + Mˆ (s) = 2Mˆ (s) + 1
2λ
e−λs ,
so we may write Equation (12) as
Mˆ (M) ≥ Mˆ (s) + 1
4λ
e−λs .
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Plugging in Claim B.2 and rearranging we obtain
e−λM
(
1 +
λM
2
)
≤ e−λs
(
3
4
+
λs
2
)
.
Setting α = λM and β = λs in the above, we obtain Equation (14). Note that s is uniquely determined
by α, and therefore β may be derived from α.
By Lemma B.4,
e−λH = e−2λs
(
1 + λs
2
)
,
and plugging in Equation (1) we get
e−λM
(
1 + λM
2
)
= e−2λs
(
1 + λs
2
)
,
which translates to Equation (13).
Since each α > 0 defines a unique canonical profile and a unique β, it follows that Equations (13)
and (14) are equivalent to Equation (12). Therefore, by Observation B.13, Equations (13) and (14) are
necessary and sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. By Observation B.15 and Lemma B.14, if α ≥ 1 then the canonical profile is a
Nash equilibrium. It is left to consider 0 < α < 1. By Lemma B.16, Equations (13) and (14) are sufficient
and necessary conditions for a Nash equilibrium. We rewrite these equations as follows.
e−α(1 + α) = e−2β1(1 + β1) , (15)
e−α
(
1 +
α
2
)
= e−β2
(
3
4
+
β2
2
)
, (16)
β1 ≤ β2 . (17)
Clearly, Equations (13) and (14) hold for α if and only if Equations (15),(16) and (17) hold for that α.
Figure 7 shows Equations (15) and (16) as parametric curves. We next show that for 0 < α < 1 these two
curves intersect at a single point (α0, β0), as depicted in Figure 7. First note that by the implicit function
theorem these two curves are continuous and differentiable for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Additionally, it is easy to
check that if α = 0 then β1 < β2 and that if α = 1 then β1 > β2. Hence, the two curves intersect at
least once for 0 < α < 1. To show they intersect exactly once, we consider the α derivatives of β1 and
β2, and show that, at each intersection point, dβ2/dα > dβ1/dα. Since β1 and β2 are continuous and
continuously differentiable as functions of α, this suffices to show that they intersect only once.
Accordingly, we now show that dβ2/dα > dβ1/dα at each intersection point. By implicit differentia-
tion (i.e., taking the α derivative of both sides of an implicit function) we obtain
−e−α α = −2e−2β1(1 + 2β1) dβ1
dα
and
−e−α
(
1 + α
2
)
= −e−β2
(
1 + 2β2
4
)
dβ2
dα
.
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Figure 7: the solid line is the curve of Equation (15) and the dashed line is the curve of Equation (16).
Rearranging, we get
dβ1
dα
=
1
2
e2β1−α
(
α
1 + 2β1
)
and
dβ2
dα
= eβ2−α
(
2 + 2α
1 + 2β2
)
.
Let (α0, β0) for 0 < α0 < 1 be an intersection of the curves, i.e., when α = α0 we have β1 = β2 = β0.
Therefore, dβ2/dα > dβ1/dα if
eβ2−α
(
2 + 2α0
1 + 2β0
)
>
1
2
e2β0−α0
(
α0
1 + 2β0
)
,
which yields
4
(
1 +
1
α0
)
> eβ0 . (18)
Assume β0 > 0, otherwise Equation (18) holds and we are done. By Equation (15), we get
e−α0(1 + α0) = e−2β0(1 + β0) ≤ e−2β0(1 + 2β0) .
Since e−x(1 + x) is monotone decreasing for x > 0, it follows that 2β0 ≤ α0. Hence, since α0 < 1, we
get
eβ0 ≤ eα02 < e 12 < 4
(
1 +
1
α0
)
,
and thus Equation (18) holds. This proves that the curves defined by Equations (15) and (16) intersect only
once for α > 0.
It follows that Equations (13) and (14) are satisfied if and only if α ≥ α0. Hence, by Lemma B.16
and Claim B.10, the canonical profile xn,λ for λ = α(n + 1) − 2 ln((1 + α)/2) is a Nash equilibrium if
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and only if α ≥ α0. Since, by Observation B.11, λ is strictly increasing as a function of α, the theorem
follows.
The second part of the theorem is obtained by numerical approximation of the point of intersection
(α0, β0).
Proof of Corollary 3.4. The maximum possible value for c is cmax ≈ 0.232, as shown at the end of
Section B.4, which yields the lower bound for H/M .
By Theorem 3.3, a Nash equilibrium exists for n ≥ 3 if and only if α ≥ α0, and by Part (1) of
Claim B.10 we have that 1 − H/M = c = (ln((1 + α)/2))/α. By simple calculus, the function c(α)
satisfies that c(α) ≥ c(α0) if α ≥ α0. We therefore obtain the upper bound on H/M by setting cmin =
c(α0) ≈ −0.392.
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